Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the govern--ment put forward a law -passed in parliament by a large majority -that calls for a com--plete nuclear phase--out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, pro--vided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balanc--ing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electrici--ty importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to na--tional greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
Introduction
Less than a week after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of Germany's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating for an initial 3--month evaluation period. These were the 7 oldest NPPs still in operation in Germany at that time plus the NPP 'Krümmel' in northern Germany, which had previously suffered from various technical problems. Two of these 8 NPPs had not been in operation since 2007 and 2009 respectively due to technical reasons. In the summer of 2011 a law came into force that finally terminated the operating licenses of those 8 plants, with an instruction for the remaining 9 NPPs to be closed down successively by the end of 2022. In making this decision, the govern--ment basically returned to the nuclear phase--out plan that had originally been imple--mented by a previous government in 2002 but had been modified by the current -then newly elected -government in October 2010, granting an average of 12 additional oper--ating years to all 17 NPPs 1 .
The decision to shut down 8 NPPs immediately and to phase--out the remaining NPPs in the years to come raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Critics warned of rising electricity prices and a considerable increase in Ger--many's fossil fuel based power generation, with related increases in CO2 emissions. Some people also predicted that Germany would become a significant net importer of electricity from neighbouring countries, including nuclear electricity from France and the Czech Republic. This paper does not aim to analyse what would have happened to CO2 emissions and electricity prices if the decisions to extend the lifetimes of the existing NPPs had not been reversed after the Fukushima accidents. Rather, it attempts to provide a) a prelim--inary assessment of the immediate changes brought about in the electricity market fol--lowing the shut down of 8 NPPs in March 2011 and b) a projection showing how the de--crease in nuclear generation will be compensated for until 2025 and what effects this may have on electricity prices and CO2 emissions.
Methodology
To analyse the short--term effects of the instant loss of around 40% of the country's nu--clear power capacity, we take the electricity production of the year 2010 as a reference to reflect the typical electricity market situation in an annual period unaffected by the phase--out decision 2 . In 2010, 15 of the 17 nuclear power plants (NPPs) produced 141 TWh of gross electricity 3 . Official energy projections in 2010, which analysed the effects of the prolongation of nuclear lifetimes (BMWi 2010; Nagl et al. 2011) 4 , predicted simi--lar levels of production until 2020. Renewables contributed 103 TWh in 2010. Net elec--tricity exports were at 18 TWh, a level that had been relatively constant since 2006 (14 to 22 TWh/a). Our comparison comprises three stages. Firstly, in section 3 we examine the changes in the German electricity system with regards to both the short--term effects from 2011 to 2013, as well as the longer--term outlook to 2025 (a few years after the completion of the nuclear phase--out). For the second stage, we use the most recently available key energy scenarios and political targets in section 4 to provide one 'optimistic' and one 'pessimis--tic' scenario on the replacement of nuclear electricity and its effects on CO2 emissions until 2025. Finally, in order to evaluate the effects of the nuclear phase--out on electricity prices, we discuss in section 5 the results of several modelling studies conducted in re--cent years. Section 6 concludes. 2 As levels of electricity generation, as well as net exports, traditionally fluctuate significantly on a season--al basis it is important to either look at entire years instead of single months when comparing periods before and after the shutdown of NPPs or to compare a certain period of a year only with the same period of another year. 3 Annual electricity generation from nuclear power in 2010 was at a similar level as in the years between 2007 and 2009 (135 to 149 TWh/a) . 4 Those scenarios of the study with lifetime extensions for NPPs predicted production levels of about 149 TWh for 2020 followed by a decline in later years.
3 Changes in power generation due to nuclear phase--out
Short--term effects until 2013
Based on preliminary statistical data on power generation in 2011 (BDEW, 2011 , 2012a , AG Energiebilanzen 2012 and on the typical production over the previous decade of the nuclear power plants still in operation (IAEA, 2012), we estimate that the permanent shutdown of the eight NPPs in March 2011 resulted in a potential 'loss' of nuclear elec--tricity generation of 32.5 TWh in 2011 and will result in a loss of around 41 TWh/a in both 2012 and 2013 5 . Relating the loss of nuclear power generation of the years 2012 and 2013 to actual electricity generation in 2010, this loss is equivalent to almost 30% of nuclear power generation and to about 7% of all electricity generation in Germany. After the permanent shutdown of the eight NPPs, the loss of nuclear power production was mostly compensated for by a combination of increased renewable electricity gener--ation, reduced net electricity exports and reduced domestic electricity demand, as the figure shows.
Electricity generation, net electricity exports and domestic electricity demand in Ger--many show typical seasonal patterns. Therefore the picture of what has changed in German electricity supply and demand since Fukushima becomes clearer when the same periods of different years are compared. This serves the purpose of eliminating seasonal effects, which can otherwise mask the de facto changes. Based on (preliminary) energy statistics, Figure 1 shows the quarterly changes in electricity supply and demand in 2011 and the first half of 2012 as compared to the respective quarters in the reference year 2010.
The figure shows that in the first quarter of 2011, which was largely unaffected by the shutdown of NPPs, German electricity supply and demand was similar to the first quar--ter of 2010. Electricity generation from renewables was up by about 3 TWh and nuclear power production and electricity demand were both slightly higher (note that a negative demand reduction in the figure corresponds to an increase in demand) while exports were slightly lower. Fossil fuels can be seen as providing the required remaining elec--tricity generation, which was about 5 TWh lower than in the first quarter of 2010. Table S1 of supplementary material)
With the permanent shutdown of eight NPPs (six of which were operating throughout 2010) the picture changed significantly from the second quarter of 2011 on. Nuclear power generation was about 10 to 12 TWh lower in all of the last three quarters of 2011 and the first two quarters of 2012 -a reduction that can be expected to be roughly con--stant until the end of 2013. In the second quarter of 2011 this reduced nuclear power supply was compensated mainly by an increased generation from renewables (5 TWh) and a significant reduction in net exports (6 TWh).
The next four quarters from July 2011 to June 2012 showed a gradual adaptation of the demand and supply balance to the new situation. Electricity generation from renewables increased successively and reached a plus of almost 11 TWh in Q2 2012. At the same time electricity demand did not further increase but fell slightly below 2010 levels and net exports increased again -although they did not fully recovered from their 2010 lev--els until Q2 2012. Increasing electricity generation from renewables, lower net exports and (slightly) lower domestic power demand combined to limit the need for an increase in fossil power generation to a very moderate level (1 to 2 TWh per quarter) in the last three quarters of 2011. The same effects, especially a further increase in electricity gen--eration from renewables even allowed fossil fuel power generation to be reduced in 2012 by 2 TWh (Q1) and 5 TWh (Q2) compared to the respective quarters of 2010. As the projections for 2012 and 2013 show, this pattern is expected to last over the coming years.
It is worth pointing out two further insights that Figure 1 offers in regard to the amount of electricity generated by renewable sources in Q2 2012: First, in that quarter renewa--ble electricity generation reached a level that projections from fall 2011 expected to be reached only by 2013. 6 And second, the additional electricity generation from renewa--bles in that quarter compared to 2010 has already almost entirely compensated the loss of electricity generation from the six (previously operational) NPPs shut down in spring 2011.
For a preliminary analysis of the entire year 2012 and the year 2013, recent projections of electricity demand and renewable electricity generation on behalf of Germany's Transmission System Operators (TSOs) (IE, 2011; Prognos, 2011) were used. These pro--jections expect gross electricity consumption to decrease over the coming years while renewable electricity generation is expected to continue to grow significantly. In 2013, the additional electricity generation from renewable sources, compared to the pre phase--out situation in 2010, is projected to be higher than the loss of nuclear electricity from the six (previously operational) NPPs. For simplicity, we assume here a balance in electricity imports and exports for Germany in 2012 and 2013 7 (whereas Germany actu--ally realised net exports of 17.7 TWh in 2010 6.0 TWh in 2011 and 7.8 TWh in the first half of 2012 8 ).
Outlook until 2025
Compensating for the closure of eight NPPs is only the first step of the nuclear phase--out in Germany. Current law states that by the end of 2022 the remaining nine NPPs have to be shut down. In the following section we evaluate whether all NPPs 9 , which in 2010 generated roughly 140 TWh, can eventually be compensated for by additional domestic renewable power generation.
The following table compares annual renewable electricity generation projections of two recent scenario studies commissioned by the federal ministries of environment (BMU) and economy (BMWi) with the mid--term projections (which end in 2016) for the electricity system operators (TSOs). Also shown are the official expectations at federal level - as described in Germany's National Renewable Energy Action Plan submitted to the European Commission in 2010 - and the expected combined effects of the political targets set individually by the German federal states ('Länder'). (dena, 2011) The table shows that the two scenario studies (BMU, 2012; BMWi, 2011 ) provide a range of expectations regarding electricity generation from renewables, mainly for 2020 and 2025. The scenario for the ministry of environment (BMU, 2012) expects renewable electricity generation to reach 283 TWh/a by 2025 while the scenario for the ministry of economy (BMWi, 2011; Fürsch et al. 2012) foresees 231 TWh/a (or 18% less) by the same year. The recent projections for the TSOs indicate that until 2015 growth in re--newable electricity generation might actually exceed the expectations in both scenarios, mainly due to the current fast expansion of solar PV. For 2020 the German government's expectations (as expressed in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan) are in be--tween the figures found in the two scenarios from both ministries. The current political targets of the Länder - which have been influenced to some extent by Fukushima - are as a sum significantly more ambitious than both the scenarios and also the federal gov--ernment's expectations.
For 2020 different expectations about the growth in onshore wind capacity are mainly responsible for the differences between the scenarios and the political targets of the Länder. As onshore wind is a technology that is already relatively close to being compet--itive even without support measures, its deployment depends to a significant extent on the states and the municipalities, who are together responsible for planning the sites of wind power plants. In 2025 the main difference between the two scenarios lies in off--shore wind capacity, but differences in solar PV deployment also play an important role (see Table S2 in the supplementary material).
This overview makes it clear that current deployment trends, as well as current political targets, indicate continued strong growth in renewable electricity generation over the coming years. Therefore, it seems likely that in comparison to 2010, by 2025 renewables will additionally supply at least the same amount of electricity as was produced by all of Germany's NPPs before the 2011 phase--out decision (about 140 TWh/a). This outcome does, of course, presuppose that the challenges of such rapid change in the method of generating electricity will be met successfully. In particular, the timely adaptation and expansion of the electricity grids, i.e. of high voltage as well as medium and low--voltage transmission and distribution lines, are critical factors in ensuring a positive outcome.
Electricity sector CO2 emissions in 2011 were only slightly higher (+0.7%) than in 2010 (UBA, 2012) as the reduction in electricity supply from nuclear energy 10 was almost en--tirely compensated by the combined effects of more renewables, lower net electricity exports and slightly lower domestic electricity demand. Fossil fuel use and related emis--sions, however, would ceteris paribus have been lower in 2011 than in 2010 if the eight NPPs (six of which were actually in operation in 2010) had not been shut down, as the additional carbon--free electricity would have replaced electricity generation in conven--tional fossil fuel power plants. Both electricity generation from fossil fuels and electricity sector CO2 emissions would have likely been 5 to 6% lower in 2011 compared to 2010 if it had not been for the shutdown of the 8 NPPs. 11
Nevertheless, to understand the bigger picture it has to be taken into account that Ger--many's fossil fuel power plants operate within the European Union's Emissions Trading System (ETS). Overall, CO2 emissions within the EU are expected to be unaffected by the phase--out decision as there is a firm cap on total emissions within the EU ETS and this cap has already been fixed for the forthcoming years. This means that additional emis--sions -or slower reductions -from the German electricity sector would 'only' lead to higher prices for CO2 emission allowances in the ETS in comparison to a nuclear prolon--gation path.
Furthermore - in the medium to long term - a (faster) nuclear phase--out does not nec--essarily imply higher CO2 emissions from the German electricity sector itself. For exam--ple, as the German Advisory Council on the Environment has pointed out (SRU, 2010), lifetime extensions for nuclear power plants would have imposed a significant barrier to the further growth of renewable energy technologies, to the increased use of combined heat and power plants and to the successful reduction in electricity demand. The incom--patibility between nuclear power and high shares of renewable energy is mainly due to the inability of the former (technically as well as economically) to provide the opera--tional flexibility that the integration of high levels of fluctuating renewable energy sources requires. The limited mitigation potential of nuclear power plants in an electric--ity system dominated by variable renewable generation, such as wind and solar, are demonstrated in modelling studies by Denholm/Hand (2011) and Hart/Jacobson (2012). 12 While current regulation in Germany 13 makes the expansion of renewable energy plants economically attractive independent of the role of nuclear power, it is likely that these 10 As is the case with most renewable energy plants, NPPs do not emit any CO2 during electricity genera--tion itself, though there are some life--cycle CO2 emissions (Weisser, 2007) . 11 These figures were calculated based on the assumptions that without the shutdown the German NPPs would have generated the same amount of electricity in 2011 as they did in 2010 (140.5 TWh), that elec--tricity generation from renewables in 2011 would have been unaffected (122 TWh) due to a stable sup--port scheme and priority grid access for renewables and that net exports would not have decreased from 17.7 TWh in 2010 to 6 TWh in 2011 but would have remained unchanged at the 2010 level. 12 See also Verbruggen (2008) for a discussion about the difficulties of combining renewable energy sources and nuclear power in a long--term mitigation strategy. 13 As in many other European countries, feed--in tariffs are used in Germany to support electricity generation from renewables (Mitchell et al., 2006; Huenteler et al. 2012) . The German feed--in--law (Renewable Energy Sources Act, EEG) stipulates fixed technology--specific tariffs to be paid (in most cases for a time span of 20 years) to the operators of renewable energy plants for each kWh they feed into the grid. The additional costs of renewables are shared among electricity consumers, though some consumers are exempted from having to pay the (full) share. The EEG also grants electricity generated from renewable sources priority access to the electricity grid. The combination of fixed feed--in tariffs and favourable political conditions for renewables would have come under much greater pressure from the politically influential energy companies that own the nuclear power plants if it had not been for the phase--out decision. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that in the medium to long--term renewable energy sources will be used to a greater ex--tent in Germany's power sector compared to the hypothetical situation of a much slower nuclear phase--out. Consequently, energy generated from renewable sources (as op--posed to fossil fuels) will eventually compensate at least partially for the electricity no longer generated in nuclear power plants.
To assess the potential development of CO2 emissions from power generation in Germa--ny we sketch two different scenarios. Both assume the current phase--out plan as a given.
The optimistic scenario combines a successful policy to reduce electricity demand with a switch within fossil generation from coal and lignite towards natural gas and the in--creased use of combined heat and power 14 and especially of renewables as described in the scenario study for the Ministry of Environment (BMU, 2012) . In such an optimistic scenario, CO2 emissions produced from German power generation would be around 50% lower in 2020 than in 1990 (see Tables  S2  and  S3 in the supplementary material). Despite the nuclear phase--out, the electricity sector would contribute disproportionate--ly to the German government's greenhouse gas reduction target of minus 40% by 2020 (vs. 1990 ).
However, in a more pessimistic scenario in which electricity consumption remains stable and renewable electricity generation increases only as assumed in the most recent sce--nario for the ministry of economy (BMWi 2011; Fürsch et al. 2012) , the use of coal and lignite are reduced only slowly. The CO2 reduction from Germany's electricity produc--tion would only decrease by around 20% to 25% by 2020 (see also Tables S3 and S4 ).
This makes it clear that the relationship between nuclear electricity generation and CO2 emissions in the short--term is not a straightforward one. As a long--term perspective, the scenarios show that the electricity sector may significantly contribute to GHG reductions despite the nuclear phase--out. But this would need strong policy to promote in particu--lar electricity savings, renewable generation and combined heat and power generation and a strengthening of the emission trading system in order to increase CO2--prices.
Electricity price effects of a complete nuclear phase--out
Increases in electricity prices and the subsequent problems for electricity intensive in--dustries and low--income households were a major concern during the phase--out discus--sions in the spring and early summer of 2011. However, one year after the shutdown of around 40% of Germany's nuclear capacity, electricity prices on the wholesale market were actually lower than before the plants were closed 15 . The reason for this surprising priority access leads to high security for renewable energy investors, independent of short--term changes in the electricity market. 14 Combined heat and power plants make use of the waste heat that occurs when electricity is generated using fossil fuels and biomass. Supplying this heat to consumers avoids the need for these consumers to generate heat themselves and, therefore, saves (fossil) energy. 15 For example the price on the German wholesale market (see EEX 2012) for one MWh of electricity to be generated and delivered in 2013 was on average 1% higher in February 2012 than it was in February 2011, before the eight NPPs were shut down. In May 2012 the average price was actually 8% lower than in February 2011. There was, however, a brief period of about three months immediately following the decision to shut down the eight NPPs when electricity prices were higher. Prices started to fall again in June 2011.
effect is probably that trends other than nuclear capacity exert greater influence on short--term electricity prices (see Nestle 2012, 155 ff) . Future electricity demand fore--casts may have decreased between early 2011 and early 2012 as all the main economic forecasts were lowered during that period. It is likely that this change, combined with falling CO2 emission prices, had a dampening effect on electricity prices.
This does mean that without the shutdown and the phase--out decision, electricity prices might have been even lower than they are currently. Such an effect can only be estimat--ed with electricity market models as has been done in a number of recent studies. Some of these studies were conducted before the 2010 decision to prolong nuclear lifetimes; consequently they estimate price reductions that may have been caused by a prolonga--tion of nuclear lifetimes. Other studies were conducted in the spring of 2011 when the prolongation had been enacted and its reversal was being discussed in the aftermath of Fukushima. These studies analysed the effects of a faster phase--out as compared to the prolonged lifetimes decided on in 2010.
To support the political decision of a lifetime expansion, in the autumn of 2010 the gov--ernment contracted a scenario study (BMWi 2010; Nagl et al. 2011) . By using an elec--tricity market model the study predicted lower electricity prices for scenarios with longer lifetime extensions until 2030. In a second set of scenarios that assumed higher retrofit investment levels for the existing NPPs they showed, however, the opposite re--sult (Nagl et al. 2011, 191) . Nestle (2012, 153 ) reports a couple of older studies with similar methodology and partly by the same authors that predicted electricity price re--ductions of 1 to 2 Euro--cent/kWh as a result of nuclear lifetime extensions.
During the spring and summer of 2011 further modelling studies were prepared (r2b, 2011 , enervis, 2011 Kemfert/Traber, 2011; Knopf et al., 2011 , BMWI 2011 ) that at--tempted to calculate the effects on electricity prices of a faster nuclear power phase--out. According to these studies the electricity price for end users in a fast phase--out scenario can be expected to be (temporarily) 0.5 to 1.3 Euro--cent/kWh above the price level of a scenario with a nuclear phase--out well after the year 2030 16 . In a meta--analysis Samadi et al. (2011) showed that this could be an overestimation due to two main reasons. Firstly, the studies assumed that the phase--out would happen three to five years earlier than is planned. Secondly, the studies assumed constant electricity demand despite in--creasing prices and a government target to reduce demand -but both these factors would work against an increase in prices resulting from a faster phase--out (Knopf et al. 2011 ).
Based on this discussion Samadi et al. (2011) conclude that it is likely that electricity prices for end users would rise by no more than 0.7 Euro--cent/kWh as a consequence of a faster nuclear phase--out and that any such increase would be temporary. It is, however, debatable whether this relatively moderate price increase would actually occur. Nestle (2012, 153ff ) presents a number of arguments supporting the idea that the studies' re--sults could still be exaggerating the de facto effects of longer nuclear lifetimes. He argues that all studies use market models that assume a perfect market, which definitely does not exist in Germany. Instead, in real life longer nuclear lifetimes would strengthen ex--isting oligopolistic structures 17 and, therefore, might lead to increased prices instead of decreased prices, Nestle argues. He further presents several empirical findings from Germany and Europe that do not show any indication that high nuclear shares mean lower electricity prices. Finally, Nestle makes the point that in the long term, security of investment is decisive in providing low electricity prices. Following the (now reversed) decision to prolong the lifetimes of nuclear power plants, however, security of invest--ment was significantly reduced in Germany due to several lawsuits contesting the politi--cal decision and the announcement by the political opposition to revoke the lifetime ex--tensions as soon as they were back in power (Nestle 2012, 157) . The phase--out that has now been decided upon is the result of a political consensus between all major parties in Germany and this has, therefore, provided greater certainty for investors 18 .
Conclusion
Despite initial concerns about Germany's decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022, recent statistics as well as scenarios and political targets show that Germany has a real--istic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with renewable electricity generation on an annual basis, provided that several related challenges, e.g. the expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. By as early as 2011, the share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity generation was at 20%, which for the first time since the early years of nuclear power in Germany in the mid 1970s was high--er than the respective share of nuclear power (about 18% in 2011). Despite phasing out nuclear power, Germany does not have to become a net electricity importer, nor will Germany be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether this will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, as well as the further expansion of renewables and combined heat and power generation.
The fact that Germany was able to achieve its nuclear policy turnaround so smoothly in 2011 by (already in the first year) replacing as much as 60% of the reduced nuclear power generation with additional renewable electricity is not surprising. An important reason is that the phase--out decision made in 2011 is technically very similar to the ini--tial German phase--out plans that were already in place between 2002 and the autumn of 2010. This meant that the German energy industry was prepared and the feed--in--tariff system ratified in the year 2000 through the Renewable Energy Sources Act was particu--larly effective in significantly increasing electricity supply from renewable sources. Germany's 'trust in renewable energy innovation', as Wittneben (2011) put it, appears to be justified. The successful expansion of renewable energy use in the electricity sector in Germany in recent years was also pinpointed as the main reason that the Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, as established by Chancellor Merkel in March 2011, supported a quick nuclear phase--out. This commission concluded that Germany does, in fact, have 'less risky alternatives' than nuclear and should, therefore, use these alternatives (Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, 2011). 17 The assumption of oligopolistic or even duopolistic structures in the German electricity market is shared by several other authors, e.g. Liebau/Ströbele (2011, 23) , Bohne (2011, 260) and Langniß et al. (2009 Langniß et al. ( , 1291 . 18 The current phase--out (compared to the situation before 2010 when the old phase--out decision was in place) has an even broader societal consensus behind it. This of course increases the opportunities for stable and clear investment frameworks in years to come. However, switching to renewable electricity imposes new challenges and also uncertainties, which will also have to be dealt with in order to deliver a stable framework.
